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Book Reviews
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAw REVOLUTION
IN THE COURTS: TODAY AND TOMORROW (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
2003)
Reviewed by Gene Shreve*
After the Revolution
Dean Symeonides has produced a splendid book on conflict of
laws, one that I doubt anyone else could have written. He prepared
The American Choice-of-Law Revolution in the Courts: Today and To-
morrow (hereinafter "Choice-of-Law Revolution") in conjunction with
his recent lectures at the Hague Academy of International Law. He
means by the term "revolution" the "intellectual movement that chal-
lenged and eventually demolished the foundations of the established
American system of conflicts law" (p. 25). Symeonides "chronicles this
revolution, but also looks to the future and explores the question of
what is, or should be, the next phase in the development of American
conflicts law." Id. The book is lucid, cogent and stimulating. Among
its attributes, Choice-of-Law Revolution provides a path out of the
labyrinth of contemporary conflicts law and theory.'
Readers in the conflicts field are already familiar with Symeo-
nides's work. He has written over a dozen books and numerous arti-
cles on the subject over the past twenty-five years. We have come to
depend upon his annual survey of developments appearing in this
* Richard S. Melvin Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. A.B.,
University of Oklahoma, 1965; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1968; LL.M., Harvard
Law School, 1975. The author wishes to thank Hannah Buxbaum for her helpful com-
ments on the manuscript.
1. I have explored different sides of this crisis elsewhere. Gene Shreve, Teaching
Conflicts, Improving the Odds, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1672 (1992); Shreve, The Odds
Against Teaching Conflicts, 27 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 587 (1996); Shreve, A Choice-of-
Law Anthology (1997); Shreve, Notes from the Eye of the Storm, 48 MERCER L. REV.
823 (1997); Shreve, Rhetoric, Pragmatism and the Interdisciplinary Turn in Legal
Criticism-A Study of Altruistic Judicial Argument, XLVI, Supplement, AM. J. OF
COMP. L. 41 (1998); Shreve, Introduction, Symposium: Preparing for the Next Cen-
tury-A New Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 399 (2000); Shreve, Every Conflicts
Decision is a Promise Broken, 60 LOuIsIANA L. REV. 1345 (2000); Shreve, Conflicts
Empiricism, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 249 (2000); Shreve, "Conflicts Altruism," in Law
and Justice in a Multistate World: Essays in Honor of Arthur T. von Mehren, Nafziger
and Symeonides eds., 383-390 (2002). My review of The Choice-of-Law Revolution
draws liberally from these sources.
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journal,2 his path-breaking work on choice-of-law codification, 3 and
his penetrating critiques of conflicts law and theory.4
Choice-of-Law Revolution consists of ten chapters, including[the] introduction. Chapter II discusses the traditional
American choice-of-law system and the academic dissent it
generated-the "scholastic revolution." Chapter III chroni-
cles the judicial manifestation of the same phenomenon-
the "judicial revolution"-and the eventual abandonment of
the traditional system. Chapter IV surveys and charts the
methodological landscape as it exists in the various states
and jurisdictions of the United States at the beginning of the
twenty-first century.
Chapter V explores the distinction between tort rules
that primarily regulate conduct (conduct-regulating rules)
and rules that primarily allocate or distribute the losses
caused by tortious conduct (loss-distributing rules). Chapter
VI discusses loss-distribution conflicts, Chapter VII dis-
cusses conduct-regulating conflicts, and Chapter VII dis-
cusses products-liability conflicts.
Finally, Chapters IX and X gauge the current position of
American conflicts law with regard to six basic methodologi-
cal and philosophical benchmarks, and then explore the
question of what should be the next step in the evolution of
American conflicts law. The thesis posited here is the next
step should include the development of new "smart" choice-
of-law rules based on the lessons of the American conflicts
experience. Chapter X concludes by describing the essential
and desired features of these rules (p. 26).
The author explains why conflicts issues are so numerous in
American courts, and why "there is no single American conflicts law"(p. 27). Under our strongly federal system of government, states(rather than the nation government) create most of the substantive
law governing civil actions in state or lower federal courts. Moreover,
while Congress or the Supreme Court has power under the Constitu-
tion to reduce conflicts law to federal law, little of that power has
been used. The consequences of this situation are twofold. First, con-
flicts choices for American courts are usually intranational (between
local state law and that of another state). Second, choice is essentially
self-regulated (largely through common law of the forum state).
These realizations are necessary for any understanding of the
shape and content of American conflicts law. Moreover, they are cru-
2. E.g., Symeon Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2002: Six-
teenth Annual Survey, 51 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 1 (2003).
3. E.g., Symeon Symeonides, Resolving Six Celebrated Conflicts Cases through
Statutory Choice-of-Law Rules, 48 MERCER L. REV. 837 (1997).
4. E.g., Symeon Symeonides, Exception Clauses in American Conflicts Law, 42
AM. J. OF COMP. L. 813 (1994); reprinted in Shreve, A Conflict of Laws Anthology 184
(1997).
1004 [Vol. 52
cial to comprehension of the subject by foreign observers. The latter
are usually from unitary legal systems where regional subdivisions
lack the authority to make local substantive law (obviating the possi-
bility of conflicts). Foreign observers, who are usually accustomed to
finding conflicts law in codes, also need special help in understanding
that most of our conflicts law is common law and why.
Symeonides explains these matters early and well. I only wish
he had not perpetuated the exasperating distinction between vertical
and horizontal conflicts in American cases. "Vertical conflicts", he
writes, "are those that occur between federal law and state law." In
contrast, "[h]orizontal conflicts are those that occur between or
among the laws of the states of the United States (interstate con-
flicts) or between the laws of these states and the laws of foreign
countries (international conflicts)" (p. 27). Despite the impeccable
provenance of this distinction,5 it has always been confusing because
vertical conflicts (between state and federal law) are not conflicts at
all. Everyone understands that valid and applicable federal law al-
ways wins. The supremacy clause6 makes this result automatic and
instantaneous. Federal law is the only valid choice.
So-called vertical conflicts may be difficult because of issues of
federal law interpretation or (less frequently) validity. But this has
nothing to do with real conflict-of-laws analysis. The latter assumes
the plausibility of applying either of two conflicting rules of law. In
the choice-of-law setting, each of the rules vying for application en-
joys a pedigree of validity in the place from which it is taken. The
laws in that sense are equally correct in their conflicting applications.
The law not chosen is not invalidated by the conflicts decision. It is
merely passed over.
Symeonides describes at length the conflicts revolution in the le-
gal academy and in the courts. He is warranted in making this phe-
nomenon the centerpiece of has book, for it was the last decisive and
intelligible development in the history of American conflicts theory.
It was in short the collapse of the lex loci approach, particularly lex
loci delicti for torts conflicts. 7
Lex loci was a strong statement of multilateralism-that is, a
body of rules designed to be administered throughout a community of
jurisdictions. The object was to secure the same choice-of-law result
for a particular kind of case, wherever that case might be tried.
Strong in the nineteenth century, the approach peaked with the
5. Arthur von Mehren & Donald Trautman, The Law of Multistate Problems:
Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws, 995 (1965).
6. United States Constitution, Article VI.
7. Symeonides makes the book's emphasis on torts cases clear from the begin-
ning, correctly observing that "tort conflicts are not only the most challenging, but
also the most numerous of conflicts cases" (p. 26). He adds:
The reason for this concentration is that tort conflicts make up the main area
of the conflicts revolution and have been the focus of, and catalyst for, a fun-
damental reorientation of choice-of-law thinking in the United States. Thus,
tort conflicts are an excellent vehicle for re-examining the methodological
and philosophical foundations of American choice of law in general. Id.
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adoption in 1934 of the American Law Institute's original Restate-
ment of the Law of Conflicts.8
Even before adoption of the original Restatement, academics had
begun to question both the theoretical underpinnings of lex loci and
its reliability in operation. Judicial rejections of the original Restate-
ment began later and were spreading by 1971, when the ALI backed
away from lex loci through publication of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts. "By the beginning of the twenty-first century, there is little
doubt that the old order has collapsed. In this sense, the revolution
that began in the 1960's has prevailed" (p. 89).9
The author reports that no consensus about what conflicts law is
or should be has emerged from the revolution. We have instead a
series of methodologies, or approaches, vying for acceptance by com-
mentators and courts. Symeonides provides concise and helpful de-
scriptions of contending approaches including Currie's Governmental
Interest Analysis, Baxter's Comparative Impairment, Leflar's
Choice-Influencing Considerations, and the ALI's Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflicts (pp. 38-63).
Symeonides reaches the correct conclusion in evaluating the role
of the conflicts academy in the last quarter of the twentieth century,
although he may be too polite. He writes that "four decades after the
revolution began, it is high time to see how it should end. It is time to
develop an exit strategy that consolidates and preserves the gains of
the revolution and turns its victory into success" (p. 419). The Ameri-
can conflicts movement may founder, he warns, "if the revolution
drags on much longer." Id.
That may be an understatement. Major differences among con-
flicts scholars (e.g., over the value of interest analysis, the role of
party expectations, the propriety of the judge's own substantive pref-
erence) became intractable years ago. In a failed attempt to make
things better, some of our best conflicts scholars wrote massive arti-
cles attempting to reconceptualize the subject.10 These exercises in
conflicts metatheory are erudite and highly ambitious. But they are
also abstruse, contentious, and virtually impossible to convert into
practice or to assimilate into a more catholic understanding of con-
flicts theory.
To be fair, each of these authors faced profound difficulties per-
haps inherent in any contemporary attempt to reconceptualize Amer-
ican conflicts law. For as confused and controversial as conflicts law
always has been,'1 the subject became far more difficult after the col-
lapse of lex loci. "More recently," acknowledged one metatheorist,
8. For more on multilateralism, see the text following note 14, infra.9. The author lists thirteen state jurisdictions whose lex loci precedents (in torts,
contracts, or both) have not been overruled. P. 91. Some of these cases are old and it is
unclear whether the same courts would follow them today. Id. at p. 90.
10. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J.
1277 (1989); Perry Dane, Vested Rights, 'Vestedness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1191 (1987); Joseph W. Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1989).11. 1. The unpopularity of conflicts law imperiled publication of the original con-
flicts Restatement. An ALI insider wrote:
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"choice of law has sometimes resembled the law's psychiatric ward.
It is a place of odd fixations and schizophrenic visions."'1 2 There is
now in our conflicts literature such a disparate, often contradictory,
accretion of policies, rules, systems, catchphrases, diagnoses, and
proposed cures that it seems almost impossible for theorists now
writing to demonstrate with complete success how their ideas are
new, helpful, or even intelligible.
This may be why the role of conflicts scholarship in judicial opin-
ions seems to be diminishing and why most new discussion about
conflicts theory has been confined to a small, if respected, academic
circle. Through the ages of Story, Beale, Currie, Baxter and Leflar,
American conflicts law took much of its shape and energy from legal
scholarship. Today's metatheorists could be thought of as the Curries
of our age. If they exert significantly less influence on courts than
their predecessors, does that bode ill for the future? How much hope
remains for clarity, coherence, and reform in conflicts theory?
If anyone can lead us out of this mess, it is Dean Symeonides.
His scholarship has always been a heartening exception to the rule.
More than a few of his learned colleagues may have been inclined to
impenetrable analysis, harsh dismissal of opposing views and hollow
claims of victory. But he has continuously demonstrated that exer-
cise of a sharp, critical mind does not require antagonism; that one
can present important and original work without condemning the
work of others; that theory and critique can be both intelligible and
profound; and that conflicts colleagues, the bench and the bar can be
supported in their struggles with conflicts law and are worth caring
about. Choice-of-Law Revolution is perhaps the most tangible evi-
dence of that commitment.
Symeonides presents an extensive amount of case data tracking
the revolution to the present time (pp. 64-153). He must have this
task in mind when he writes later in the book of "the thankless job of
collecting, sorting out, synthesizing, and recasting in systematic de-
scriptive statement what courts have done" (p. 429).13 The principal
The law book people with whom the Institute was associated in publishing
the Restatement shook their heads dolefully at the mention of a volume in
the conflict of laws. They predicted that any book bearing that title would be
a financial failure because of the unpopularity of the subject. Only when
marked as part of a set of books, they said, would the Restatement volume in
conflict of laws reach the shelves of lawyers and law libraries.
Herbert Goodrich, Yielding Place to New: Rest Versus Motion in Conflict of Laws 9
(1950). Prominent legal commentators found the subject mysterious or worse. Benja-
min Cardozo called it "one of the most baffling subjects of legal science." Benjamin
Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science 67 (1928). It was to Max Rheinstein the
"most difficult and most confused of all branches of the law." Max Rheinstein, How to
Review a Festschrift, 11 Am. J. COMP. L. 632, 655 (1962). William Prosser dismissed
conflicts law as "a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by
learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in strange
and incomprehensible jargon." William Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L.
REV. 959, 971 (1953).
12. Perry Dane, Conflict of Laws, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 209-20 (D. Patterson ed., 1996).
13. Continuing, he suggests that the task
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means by which he sorts his cases (tort and contract) is to assign each
to one of a set of methodological categories. 14 For one part of his
study, his categories are "Traditional, Restatement 2nd, Significant
Contacts, Interest Analysis, Lex Fori, Better Law," and "Combined
Modern" (p. 71).
Some readers might question the utility of separating cases by
methodology. The author does himself. He acknowledges that for
some jurisdictions "precedents are equivocal, or even irreconcilable"(p. 93). Moreover, "[e]ven if the above uncertainties did not exist, one
might have good reason to object to classifying states on the basis of
choice-of-law methodology, because such classifications tend to in-
flate the importance of methodology in explaining or predicting court
decisions" (p. 96). In defense, Symeonides writes:
The author's view is that these classifications are help-
ful, at least as tentative indications of where a particular ju-
risdiction stands. The study of any plurilegal system,
especially on as vast as that of the United States, would be
far more difficult in not impossible, without a modicum of
categorization and sorting out, of seeking and cataloguing
the common denominators among the various units. Taxon-
omy is not an end in itself, but it is a necessary first step in
any study of multiple objects. It is also a medium for seeing
the forest from the trees (p. 97).
How true.
Two distinctions have become important recently in American
conflicts thinking: (1) multilateralism versus unilateralism 15 in
choice-of-law policy; and (2) loss distribution versus conduct regula-
tion in torts cases. 16 Choice-of-Law Revolution adds significantly to
the discussion of both.
Multilateralism strives for uniform results in choice of law. To
the multilateralist judge, the possible sources of chosen law are sov-
ereigns, or jurisdictions, that make up a kind of legal community.
Each type of case has its own conflicts rule, administrable throughout
that legal community. The lex loci delicti rule that the place of injury
is helpful in at least two independent ways: (1) it helps to sharpen academic
theory and ground it on reality rather than intuition. Indeed, it is one thing
to propagate a theory and look for cases to support it, and another think to
read all the cases and then to formulate a theory; and (2) it is a necessary
prerequisite to the next step-articulating normative rules that can correct
in the future what has been wrongly decided in the past. Thus, descriptive
rules are a necessary foundation for prescriptive or normative rules, of one
considers the latter desirable. Id.
14. He also sorts case data by other modes, for example a jurisdictional time line
for rejection of lex loci delicti (p. 65).
15. The distinction is central to the organization of two recent books. Friedrich
Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice (1993); Gene Shreve, A Conflict-of-
Laws Anthology (1997).
16. E.g., Patrick Borchers, The Return of Territorialism to New York's Conflicts
Law: PADuLA v. LILARN PROPERTIES CORP., 58 ALBANY L. REV. 775 (1995); Wendy Per-
due, A Reexamination of the Distinction between "Loss Allocating" and "Conduct-Reg-
ulating" Rules, 60 LA. L. REV. 1251 (2000).
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is the source of governing tort law would be an example. Ideally, each
member of this community of jurisdictions would use the common
conflicts rule, and uniform choice-of-law results would exist in fact. If
so, the high-minded suppositions of interjurisdictional order and com-
ity attending the conception of multilateralism offered by Joseph
Story17 would be vindicated. To many multilateralists, however, com-
plete or even substantial interjurisdictional cooperation in fact is un-
necessary to justify their approach. They have contended that
multilateralism in any event advances policies of antidiscrimination.
And some like Joseph Beale used vested rights analysis to maintain
that multilateralism leads to the only valid source of law.18
Unilateralism in the United States shares with multilateralism
the idea that choice of law should search for the appropriate sover-
eign (law source). But unilateralism displays a keen interest in the
content of the laws vying for application. The unilateralist examines
them to determine whether each, upon closer study, is truly applica-
ble. A unilateralist finds a law truly applicable only if the case at
hand is one of the cases that the law was designed to govern. Then
the sovereign who created the law may be said, in Brainerd Currie's
words, 19 to be interested in having it applied. Interest analysis is the
linchpin for conflicts unilateralism in this country. Correspondingly,
it is the focal point of unending debate between unilateralists and
multilateralists. 20
Not only does Choice-of-Law Revolution provide a clear and thor-
ough examination of the multilateral\ unilateral distinction (pp. 357-
376), but the author enriches our understanding of that distinction by
demonstrating its relationship to a number of other distinctions im-
portant to conflicts discourse: territoriality versus non-territoriality
(pp. 376-379); international uniformity versus ethnocentricism (pp.
379-385); jurisdiction-selection versus law-selection (pp. 385-397);
conflicts justice versus material justice (pp. 397-405); legal certainty
versus flexibility (pp. 405-413).
Symeonides devotes three chapters to loss-distribution and con-
duct-regulation policies in tort conflicts. Loss distribution policies ad-
dress questions whether or to what extent plaintiffs harm should be
compensated. The author writes:
one of the common points of reference among all branches of
the revolution has been the acceptance of the parties' domi-
cile as the focal point around which to resolve conflicts be-
17. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (1834).
18. Joseph Beale, "History and Doctrines of the Conflict of Laws," 3 A Treatise on
the Conflict of Laws 1967-1967 app. (1935).
19. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
Laws, 1959 DuKE L. J. 171.
20. See, e.g., Symposium, Interest Analysis in Conflict of Laws: An Inquiry into
Fundamentals with a Side Glance at Products Liability, 46 OHIO ST. L. J. 457 (1985)
(contributions by John Kozyris, Lea Brilmayer, Robert Sedler, Russell Weintraub,
Friedrich Juenger, Dimitrios Evrigenis, Donald Berman, George Zaphirous, Gene
Shreve, William Luneberg, and Symeon Symeonides); Shreve, Anthology, supra note
1 at 71-129.
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tween loss-distribution rules. In the span of a few years, the
parties' domicile, which was an irrelevant factor under the
lex loci delicti rule, became a primary factor in loss distri-
bution conflicts, and territoriality has been forced to make
room for the principle of personality (p. 174).
Thus, where the parties are from different states, plaintiff would seek
application of his home-state, pro-recovery law upon a showing that
the policy behind that law was to more fully compensate citizens. But
defendant would seek application his home-state, anti-recovery law
upon a showing that the policy behind that law was to limit the finan-
cial responsibility of citizens for their torts.
In contrast are those substantive rules of tort law "whose pri-
mary function is to regulate conduct, even if they ultimately also
have a bearing on loss distribution" (p. 239). Symeonides notes that
"[u]nlike loss-distributing rules which focus both on people and on
territory, conduct-regulating rules are primarily territorial ." Id. At
the same time, conduct may have more than one geographical refer-
ence point. "[O]ne should be prepared to accept the premise that,
when the conduct and the injury are not in the same state, both of
these contacts deserve due consideration" (p. 240). More complicated,
"the contacts pertinent in identifying the concerned states in punitive
damages conflicts are: (a) the place of conduct; (b) the place of injury;
and (c) the tortfeasor's domicile or principal place of business" (p.
262).
The author's searching analysis leads to the creation of five
choice-of-law rules for loss-distribution cases (pp. 188, 202, 209, 219,
227), a general rule for conduct-regulation cases (p. 260), and a spe-
cial conduct-regulating rule for punitive damages (p. 275). This rule-
based approach is in keeping with the vision of the future he offers at
the end of the book.
It is ... time to recognize that the revolution has gone
too far in embracing flexibility to the exclusion of all cer-
tainty, just as the traditional system had gone too far toward
certainty to the exclusion of all flexibility.
A correction is needed, and a new equilibrium should be
sought between these two perpetually competing needs.
The view of this author is that it is now necessary and
possible to articulate a new breed of smart, evolutionary
choice-of-law rules that will accomplish both objectives: (1)
restore a proper equilibrium between certainty and flexibil-
ity; and (2) preserve the substantive and methodological ac-
complishments of the revolution (p. 419, emphasis in
original).2 '
21. He adds:[Tihanks to the first Restatement, we now know what to avoid: broad, all-
embracing, inflexible, monolithic rules, based on a single connecting factor
chosen on metaphysical grounds. Thanks also to the conflict revolution, we
also know what to aim for: narrow, flexible, content- and issue-oriented rules,
based on experience, with occasional built-in escape clauses that would allow
these rules to grow and to adjust to changing needs and values (p. 422).
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REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COM-
PARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Oxford University Press 2004)
Reviewed by Luca Enriques*
The Comparative Anatomy of Corporate Law
I. INTRODUCTION: THE FUNCTIONAL ANATOMY OF
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW
Seven leading corporate law scholars from top academic and re-
search institutions in seven countries and three continents worked
together for nine years' to produce the first global and comprehensive
comparative and functional analysis of corporate law. The authors
managed to meet "half a dozen"2 times together, and many more
times in smaller groups,3 to discuss their enterprise and prepare
"countless" 4 drafts of each chapter. Three conferences and a number
of seminar presentations gave the authors feedback from other aca-
demics, 5 and meanwhile the chapters "circulated around the world
countless times for revisions, comments etc."6 The recognized intel-
lectual leader among the authors7 is Reinier Kraakman, a Harvard
Law School Professor, who had already made path-breaking contri-
butions to corporate law studies, often in partnership with one of the
others, Henry Hansmann. Their team effort was organized under the
stewardship of one of the most enterprising and dynamic academics
in the field, Gerard Hertig.8 What all this leads to is a volume, The
Anatomy of Corporate Law (hereinafter, "the book"), that is certain to
* This review is based on an unpublished paper prepared for the conference,
"The Anatomy of Corporate Law," held in London on June 30, 2003, and circulated
under the title, "The Comparative Anatomy of Related Party Transactions Law." I
wish to thank Alain Pietrancosta, Peter Mulbert, and Robert Thompson for helpful
information about French, German, and US law respectively, and Brian Cheffins, G-
rard Hertig, David Skeel, and other participants at the London conference for very
helpful comments on earlier drafts. Usual disclaimers apply.
1. See Reinier Kraakman, Preface to REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAw v, v (2004) (hereinafter: KRAAKMAN ET AL.). The authors of the book
under review are Paul Davies (London School of Economics), Henry Hansmann (now
at Yale Law School), Gdrard Hertig (ETH, Zurich), Klaus Hopt (Max-Planck-Institut
for Foreign and Private International Law, Hamburg), Hideki Kanda (University of
Tokyo), Reinier Kraakman (Harvard Law School), and Edward Rock (University of
Pennsylvania).
2. E-mail from Gerard Hertig to the author (July 22, 2004) (on file with the
author).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. KRAAMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at ix.
6. E-mail from Grard Hertig to the author, supra note 2.
7. As shown by the fact that his name is first among the authors' on the cover of
the book and that the Preface is his..
8. Id. (reluctantly conceding what other authors had agreed upon during the
London conference, i.e. that he "did play a coordination/entrepreneurial role," while at
the same time stressing that "it truly was [a team effort]").
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